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It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the
protection from the negative consequences of undesirable outcomes. To test
this claim, we investigated how experienced outcomes triggering loss and
regret impacted people’s tendency to decide alone or join a group, and how
decisions differed when voluntarily made alone versus in group. Replicated
across two experiments, participants (n=125 and n=496) selected whether
to play alone or contribute their vote to a group decision. Next, they chose
between two lotteries with different probabilities of winning and losing. The
higher the negative outcome, the more participants switched from deciding
alone to with others. When joining a group to choose the lottery, choices
were less driven by outcome and regret anticipation. Moreover, negative out-
comes experienced alone, not part of a group vote, led to worse subsequent
choices than positive outcomes. These results suggest that the protective
shield of the collective reduces the influence of negative emotions that may
help individuals re-evaluate past choices.1. Introduction
When things gowrong, people often look for someone to blame. Fromwar tribu-
nals and post-mortem inquiry committees investigating global disasters to
brooding over coffee the day after a failed dinner date, people strive to find out
who or what to blame. What is often forgotten is the uncertainty under which
decisions had been made. In retrospect, the negative outcomes often seem
to have been the deterministic consequences of the decisions. Decision-makers
therefore seek to protect themselves from possible future blame for difficult
uncertain decisions. A doctor who has documented her colleagues’ confirmation
of a diagnosis is better able to defend herself against both regret and charges of
malpractice. Intelligence analysts who held that the weapons of mass destruction
existed in Iraq in 2003 still cite the consensus among various agencies as their
strongest excuse. Indeed, circumstantial evidence from numerous studies in
social and cognitive psychology suggests that when facing decisions with uncer-
tain outcomes, being in a collective can help protect individual members from
negative consequences [1]. Here we directly test this hypothesis in an empirical
investigation that demonstrates how experienced outcomes change the propen-
sity to join groups, which may protect from anticipated and experienced
consequences of negative outcomes.
Previous studies in decision-making using behavioural [2–4] and psycho-
physiological measures [2] have shown that negative outcomes trigger strong
negative emotions, such as loss after negative factual outcomes (i.e.whena selected
option results in a negative outcome) and regret after negative counterfactual
outcomes (i.e. when an unselected option results in a better outcome than the
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Figure 1. Experimental design. (a) Timeline of the experiment. First, partici-
pants chose whether to play alone or in a group. Second, they chose
between two lotteries. Both factual and counterfactual outcomes were
shown. (b) Description of parameters of interest. The size of coloured sectors
of the circle represents the different probabilities of winning or losing. p and
q are the probabilities of getting the best outcomes, x1 (lottery 1) and x2 (lottery
2), respectively. y1 and y2 represent the worst outcomes for lotteries 1 and 2,
respectively. Predictors of lottery choice: ΔEV corresponds to the difference in
expected value between lottery 1 and lottery 2. ΔAR represents the difference
in anticipated regret between the two lotteries; the higher this difference, the
more choosing lottery 1 over lottery 2 allows for minimizing future regret. Pre-
dictor of the group choice: experienced outcome combines both actual and
counterfactual outcomes to quantify the amount of experienced positive or




2selected one). Moreover, individuals choose not only options
that optimize their choice by maximizing the expected value,
but also those that minimize future regret [2–7]. The experience
of negative emotions associated with costly decisions is related
to the responsibility for those decisions: emotional responses to
losses are stronger if people are responsible for their actions [3].
Furthermore, feeling responsible has been suggested as a
prerequisite to feeling regret about an outcome [8].
We recently hypothesized that, by distributing the
responsibility for decision outcomes among several group
members, making decisions as part of a group could help regu-
late negative emotions associated with negative factual and
counterfactual outcomes [1]. Supporting this claim, choosing
a lottery as a part of a group reduces the feeling of responsi-
bility and regret over negative outcomes [9]. Moreover,
anticipating regret leads people to delegate difficult decisions
to others [10] and use institutions strategically in order to
share responsibility with others when trading lottery tickets
[11]. It remains unknown; however, how negative emotions
influence the choice to make costly decisions alone or with
others, and how these voluntarily chosen group decisions
may differ from individual ones.
Here we investigate how negative outcomes influence
participants’ preference to make decisions alone or as part of
a group. Using a task in which decisions were costly and
could elicit highly negative emotions via factual (loss) and
counterfactual (regret) outcomes [3], we asked participants
to choose, on a trial-by-trial basis, whether to decide alone or
contribute their opinion to a majority vote-count in a group
of five. Such majority votes offer an empirically controlled
way of sharing responsibility with other individuals for a
choice’s outcome. Using computational behavioural analysis,
we assessed whether the previously established influence of
expected value and anticipated regret on individual lottery
decisions changes when the participant acted as a member of
a group. Importantly, our design offered a powerful quanti-
tative method to test how the valence and magnitude of
experienced outcomes, combining loss and regret, influenced
participants’ choices to decide alone or in a group.
Based on our hypothesis that being a member of a group
can protect individuals from the negative consequences of
decisions [1], we predicted that (i) for a person making a
decision alone, the more negative their experience from an out-
come, the higher the likelihood of them joining a group for the
next decision; (ii) when individuals vote as part of a group,
their choice would be less strongly driven by anticipated out-
comes than when deciding privately; and (iii) experienced
negative outcomes would disrupt subsequent value-based
choices less strongly if experienced in a group as compared
to individually.2. Material and methods
(a) Participants
In experiment 1, data were collected using Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk and included a total of 125 participants (mean age 31.72±
7.31, 88 males). In experiment 2, data were collected using prolific
(www.prolific.co) and included a total of 502 participants initially.
Six participants were excluded from analyses because they
responded too fast (mean reaction time less than 200 ms), and/
or missed more than half of the trials, and/or consistently pressed
the same left or right button for lottery choice (more than 90% ofthe time), leaving 496 participants (mean age 31.49± 11.09, 215
females). The experiment lasted around 10 min and each partici-
pant was paid $2+ $1 bonus in experiment 1 and £1.5 +up to £1
bonus in experiment 2.
(b) Experimental design and task
(i) Timeline
Participants completed a value-based decision-making task
adapted from Coricelli et al. [3]. At each trial, they had to choose
between two lotteries where the size of coloured sectors of a
circle represented the probabilities of winning or losing (blue sec-
tors depicted the chance of getting the best outcome and red
sectors depicted the chance of getting theworst outcome; figure 1a).
Choices were registered by pressing either the F key (for the lottery
on the left, lottery 1) or theK key (for the lotteryon the right, lottery
2). In each round, before choosing between the lotteries, partici-
pants had to decide whether to play the round alone or in a




3key, this mapping was counterbalanced across participants in
experiment 2). Choice time for both decisions was limited to 4 s
each. Participants were told that if they did not answer within
that time they would receive the worst possible outcome in
that round.
Once a participant selected a lottery, a black square framed the
selection and an image of an individual appeared underneath. Par-
ticipants in a group saw a black square around the majority option
with an image of five individuals underneath. The outcomes of
both lotteries were shown for 3 s (figure 1a). After eight practice
trials, each participant completed four blocks of 12 trials each.
(ii) Majority vote procedure
When deciding to play in a group with four other players, partici-
pants were told that the chosen lottery depended on a majority
rule: the lottery chosen by three ormore players would be selected.
In experiment 1, the confederate votesweredrawn from the be-
haviour of 11 participants who, in an earlier pilot, had undertaken
the same task under alone condition only. This pilot was con-
ducted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mean age 41.5 ± 14, five
males). For each pair of lotteries, the lottery that was chosen by
more than five participants was selected as the group choice.
In experiment 2, to avoid deception and to allow for more
variability in the group decisions, the majority vote was based
on the participant’s choice and the choices of randomly drawn
samples from experiment 1 data for the same lottery pair. For
each pair of lotteries, the lottery that was chosen by more than
three participants (including the participant’s choice) was
selected for the round.
This design allowed us tomaintain control over ‘other’s behav-
iour’ as an independent variable. It is important to underscore
here that the aggregation of the votes of such virtual groups
does not constitute an emergent collective. The design we
chose here is appropriate to test our hypothesis about how the
context of deciding alone versus with others affects individual
choices but, and importantly, our hypothesis does not involve
examining the emergent collective behaviour of a group of
interacting individuals.
(iii) Payment and incentive
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were told they
would receive $2 (experiment 1) or £2 (experiment 2) for their par-
ticipation and that one round would be randomly selected so that
they could earn up to an additional $1 (experiment 1) or £1 (exper-
iment 2), depending on the outcomeof that round. In experiment 1,
we accorded the $1 bonus to all participants. In experiment 2, one
round was indeed randomly selected and participants received a
bonus of £1 if they received the highest outcome (200), £0.25 if
they received the second highest outcome (50), and no bonus if
they hadn’t answer on that round or received a negative outcome.
(iv) Lottery structure
The lotteries presented were identical to the 48 trials previously
used byCoricelli et al. [3]. The samepairings of combinations of out-
comes (with values of 200, 50, −50 or −200) with three possible
outcome probabilities (0.2, 0.5 and 0.8)were used (see the electronic
supplementarymaterial, table 1). Actual probabilities in each round
corresponded to the displayed probabilities. Pairs of lotteries were
shown in a randomized order for each participant.
(c) Behavioural modelling of choice and statistical
analyses
Therewere two choices of interest: the lottery choice (lottery 1 or lot-
tery 2, based on probabilities and outcomes) and the group choice
(playalone or in a group, in each roundbefore seeing the two lotteryoptions; figure 1). To computewhat significantly influenced lottery
choice and group choice, while accounting for individual variabil-
ity, we used mixed-effects logistic regression models implemented
with maximum penalized likelihood (MPL) via the glmer function
in theRpackage lme4 [12]. In the performedmixedmodels, subjects
were modelled as a random intercept and the propensity to play
alone as random slope. The parametric regressors were scaled
before being entered in the models. The regressors used to explain
both the types of choices are detailed below.(i) Group choice at time t
Four predictors at time t− 1 (previous round): valence, magnitude,
previous condition, and group status, were computed as follows.
First, the experienced outcome at t− 1 was computed as a
combination of factual and counterfactual: obtained outcome–
unobtained outcome from unchosen lottery. Negative values of
experienced outcome correspond to increasing loss and regret,
while positive values correspond to increasing sense of success
and relief. We then separated the valence of the outcome from
the magnitude of experienced outcome.
— For the valence predictor, these values were sign transformed
to obtain negative (−1) versus positive outcomes (+1).
— For the magnitude predictor, we transformed experienced
outcome values into magnitude values only reflecting the
change in magnitude between the outcomes. Outcome
values (−400, −250, −150, −100, 100, 150, 250, 400) were trans-
formed for negative values into (0, 150 250, 300) and for
positive values into (0, 50, 150, 300).
Negative values:
(i) 0 + (150 difference between −400 and −250)
(ii) 50 + (100 =difference between −250 and −150)
(iii) 250 + (50 =difference between −150 and −100)
Positive values:
(i) 0 + (50 difference between 100 and 150)
(ii) 50 + (100 =difference between 150 and 250)
(iii) 150 + (150 =difference between 250 and 400)
Owing to the lottery structures, the magnitude of possible out-
comes was slightly different for positive and negative outcomes.
— Previous condition: whether the round is played alone or in a
group (and thus whether outcome is experienced alone or as
part of a group).
— Group status: when the condition is in a group, whether the
participant is in the minority or the majority (for the lottery
choice based on a majority rule).
(ii) Lottery choice at time t
Two predictors of lottery choice (choosing lottery 1) were com-
puted as inCoricelli et al. [3]: expected value and anticipated regret.
— Difference in expected value between lottery 1 and lottery 2:
DEV ¼ EV1 EV2,
where EV is:
EV1 ¼ px1þ (1 p)y1 ðlottery 1Þ
EV2 ¼ qx2þ (1 q)y2 (lottery 2):
p and q represent the probability of receiving the highest out-
come x1 or x2 (in blue; figure 1) for lottery 1 and lottery 2,
respectively. y1 and y2 denote the lowest outcome from lottery




4in expected of value between lottery 1 and lottery 2, the more the
participant should choose lottery 1.
— Difference in anticipated regret between lottery 1 and lottery 2:
DAR ¼ AR2AR1,
where AR is:
AR1 ¼ jy1 x2j AR2 ¼ jy2 x1j:
Anticipated regret is represented by the difference between
the lowest and the highest outcome across lotteries. If the ΔAR
is positive, receiving the worst outcome from lottery 2 while lot-
tery 1 results in its best outcome will elicit higher regret than
would receiving the worst outcome from lottery 1 while lottery
2 results in its best outcome. Therefore, the higher the value of
ΔAR, the more anticipated regret would be avoided by choosing
lottery 1. Note that while the expected value depends on the
probabilities related to the lotteries, anticipated regret depends
solely on outcomes values.
The interaction of these predictors with the current condition
(playing alone/in group at time t) was also entered in the model
predicting lottery choice. For the analyses on how experienced
outcome at t− 1 influenced lottery choices at time t, previous
condition, valence and group status (t− 1) were entered as pre-
dictors of lottery choice in addition to ΔEV and ΔAR (t) of that
lottery pair.
ΔEV and ΔAR are correlated choice predictors (r=0.75, p<
0.001); however, (i) their variance inflation factor is equal to 2.33
suggesting that it is acceptable to put them in the same general
linear model. In the models, only the variance not accounted by
the other predictor is reflected in the results. (ii) The parametric
regressors were QR Gram Schmidt orthogonalized (using QR()
and QR.Q functions in R) to enter in our generalized linear
model the residuals of the regressors after removing the common
variance to both predictors. This yielded to exactly similar results
(see the electronic supplementary material, table 7) confirming
that it is correct to include them both as predictors of the lottery
choice, and showing that this orthogonalization procedure was
performed automatically via the glmer R function.
Confidence intervals of parameter estimates of the mixed
models are reported andwere calculated using the function confint
in R. Themetafor package in R [13]was used to performmeta-ana-
lytic analyses combining both experiments via the function rma (to
assess what are the consistent results across both experiments).
For clarity of presentation of the results, descriptive results






 (1 p)Þ 4 n,
where p is the proportion choosing lottery 1 (versus lottery 2) or
playing in a group (versus alone) and n is the number of
observations.3. Results
Following our three predictions, we first consider what
influenced the decision to join a group or decide alone. The
second and third sections examine the determinants of the
lottery choice.
(a) When to join a group decision
In each round, before seeing the lotteries, participants first chose
whether they wanted to play an upcoming lottery choice alone
or in a group. On every trial, this decision to join the group ornot was made before the lotteries were seen. This ensured
that we could assess the direct influence of previous experi-
enced outcome on this choice independently from the
upcoming lottery structure. Participants showed highly diverse
patterns of behaviour in their tendency to play alone or with a
group (figure 2a). It is important to note that about half of par-
ticipants consistently chose to play alone or in group (more than
90% of the times––experiment 1, 60 out of 125; experiment 2,
269 out of 496) and therefore were not affected by experienced
outcomes.
Asking participants to choose whether to play alone or in a
group at the start of each trial allowed us to quantify the impact
of the magnitude and the valence of experienced outcomes on
the probability of joining the group in the next trial (figure 1b).
This measure combines factual and counterfactual outcomes,
with no aim of dissociating between the influence of one or
the other, but rather focusing on a global valence measure
(i.e. the magnitude of negative and positive experience)
with which we could test our predictions. We reasoned that
the more negative experienced outcomes, the higher increased
loss and regret by comparing the actual outcome to a more
positive counterfactual outcome and vice versa, the more
positive the outcome, the higher the positive experiences of
success and relief. We then define two regressors to dissociate
the valence (positive versus negative experience) from the
magnitude (amount of experienced loss/regret and success/
relief) of the outcome (see methods for details).
We first tested our prediction that a negative outcome
experienced alone will increase the likelihood of joining a
group for the next decision [1]. We therefore considered
another regressor indicating the participants’ previous
condition—that is, whether they were playing alone or in a
group. We examined the effect of previous condition and
valence, and their interaction on the choice to join a group on
the next trial using mixed-effects logistic regression models.
A main effect of previous condition (see full statistical details
in the electronic supplementary material, tables 2, 3 and 4, all
z>8.96, all p<0.001), reflected the fact that some participants
chose to play predominantly alone or in a group (as shown
in figure 2a), but also a sort of inertia effect whereby people
stick to their previous decision. Indeed, even when excluding
participants who invariably chose to stay alone or in group––
the main effect of previous condition remained significant
(see the electronic supplementary material, table 5, meta-
analytically z=−3.9, p<0.001).(i) Valence effects
An interaction between previous condition and valence (all
z>4.79, all p<0.001, see the electronic supplementarymaterial,
tables 2, 3 and 4, but also electronic supplementary material,
table 8 for results after excluding participants who consistently
chose to play alone or in group) revealed a win-stay lose-
change effect: participants were more likely to switch their
choice after a negative versus a positive outcome experienced
alone (all z>3.11, all p<0.04, also see individual difference
information on the propensity to switch from alone to group
based on valence in the electronic supplementary material,
figure 1), or in a group (all z>3.57, all p<0.002) (figure 2b).
This confirms our first prediction that people are more likely
to join groups after individually experiencing negative out-
comes. Next, we asked if the likelihood of joining groups
changed linearlywith themagnitude of experienced outcomes.
play aloneplay in group










































































Figure 2. Group choice. (a) Histogram showing participants’ overall tendency to play alone or in a group in experiment 1 (left panel) and experiment 2 (right
panel). (b) In experiment 2, proportion of rounds where participants switched their choice to play alone or in group as a function of valence in the previous round:
− negative outcomes, + positive outcomes, and of previous condition: outcomes experienced alone (yellow), outcomes experienced in group (green). (c) In exper-
iment 2, proportion of rounds where participants switched their group choice as a function of outcome magnitude. (i) Outcome experienced alone. (ii) Outcome
experienced in a group. Error bars represent standard errors of proportions. Statistics on the figure correspond to the reported outputs of the mixed models, ***p<




5(ii) Sensitivity to the magnitude of outcomes
An interaction was observed between previous condition
and magnitude (meta-analytically across both experiments
(z>1.96, p<0.05,). The choice to join the group was sensitive
to the magnitude of outcomes experienced alone (meta-
analytically z=2.36, p=0.01 – experiment 1 p=0.17, exper-
iment 2 p=0.04). In other words, the less positive/more
negative the outcome, the more likely were the participants
to join a group on the next round. By contrast, when in
group, the magnitude of outcomes did not change the propen-
sity to join the group in the next trial (all p>0.26) (figure 2c).
Thus, when participants played alone, they were sensitive to
the magnitude of outcomes beyond the win-stay lose-change
effect, to guide their choice to join the group.
We then turned to our next question: once in the group,
what makes people stay or leave the group above the
win-stay lose-change effect?(iii) Groups status and outcomes
Being in a group is a compromise between retaining full auton-
omy for a choice and giving up autonomy completely [1]. In
our study, this compromise was achieved when participants’vote corresponded to the majority vote, when they shared
responsibility with group members for decision outcomes.
We predicted that when supported by majority, people
would stay in the group no matter the outcome, as they
would be protected from loss and regret by shared responsibil-
ity. However, when in the minority and not responsible for the
outcome, we predicted that participants would be more likely
to leave the group following negative outcomes.
Being in majority or minority influenced the decision to
play alone or in group, as well as experienced outcome effects
on this decision. Indeed, we examined the effect at t− 1 of
group status (majority/ minority), valence and magnitude,
and their interaction on the choice to join a group at twhen con-
sidering only previous group trials. Participants were more
likely to choose to play in group again if they were part of
the majority i.e. agree with the group decision, as compared
to minority (all z>2.5, all p<0.01) (electronic supplementary
material, figure 2a). Agreeing with the group may also protect
from the influence of outcome valence on the decision to play
alone or in group: an interaction between group status and
valence appeared in experiment 1 (meta-analytically z=1.67,
p=0.09, experiment 1 p=0.0413, experiment 2 p=0.25),
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Figure 3. Lottery choice. (a) Proportion of choosing lottery 1 versus lottery 2 based on the difference in expected value ΔEV in experiment 2. (b) Proportion of
choosing lottery 1 versus lottery 2 based on the difference in anticipated regret ΔAR in experiment 2. (a,b) Yellow represents the alone condition while green
represents the group condition. Error bars represent standard errors of proportions. (c) Parameter estimates of expected value (ΔEV) and anticipated regret (ΔAR) in
mixed models separately for trials where participants played alone (yellow) or in a group (green). (d ) Parameter estimates of expected value (ΔEV) in mixed models
separately following trials where participants experienced negative (−) and positive (+) outcomes on the previous round. From left to right: outcomes experienced
alone (yellow), outcomes experienced in group majority (green), outcomes experienced in group minority (green) (c,d). Error bars represent the standard error of the




6after minority as compared to majority (electronic supplemen-
tary material, figure 2b).
Thus far we saw that negative versus positive outcomes
drive people to switch from playing alone to playing in a
group. Moreover, this change was sensitive to the magnitude
of the outcomes. We next asked if when in a group, the
individual would be less likely to worry about regret.
(b) Influence of anticipated outcomes on lottery choices
made alone or in group
Previous studies have shown that when deciding individually,
anticipated regret could impair risky decision making in
individuals.We askedwhether this detrimental impact of antici-
pated regret on value-based choice would be reduced when
participants choose as part of a collective (versus individually).
We considered two predictors of the lottery choice: expected
value (ΔEV) and anticipated regret (ΔAR; figure 1b; seemethods
fordetails), andtheir interactionwithwhetherparticipants chose
toplayaloneor ingroupat t (currentcondition, lotteryalone/lot-
tery in group). Mixed-effects logistic regressionmodels showed
an additive influence of expected value (all z> 25.03, all p<
0.001, see the electronic supplementary material, tables 2, 3,
4) and anticipated regret (all z> 2.26, all p< 0.05). This result
established that participants minimized future regret when
choosing between the two lotteries (figure 3a,b).Importantly, current condition (alone/in group) inter-
acted with both expected value (all z>3.24, all p< 0.002)
and anticipated regret (meta-analytically z=−2.29, p= 0.02,
experiment 1 p> 0.5, experiment 2 p=0.01), showing that
ΔEV and ΔAR parameter estimates were both reduced in
the group as compared to alone condition (figure 3a,b,c).
These results support our hypothesis that contributions
to group decisions are less driven by expected value and
regret than individual decisions. Joining groups can therefore
reduce the consideration of anticipated outcomes associated
with emotions of loss and regret. In the next section, we test
the hypothesis that negative experienced outcomes leave less
of an adverse emotional impact on people’s decision making
if they were experienced as a group versus alone.
(c) Influence of experienced outcomes on lottery
choices
To test our final prediction that experienced negative outcomes
disrupt subsequent lottery choices less strongly if experienced
after a group versus individual decision, we asked how experi-
enced outcomes impact the next lottery choice. We entered
(i) valence at t−1 and (ii) previous condition (at t− 1) (alone
or in group), as predictors of the lottery choice at trial t in
our mixed model, in addition to ΔEV(t) and ΔAR(t). In other




7one round affect the influence of expected value and antici-
pated regret on the lottery choice in the next round. An
interaction between previous condition, valence and ΔEV
was observed (all z>2.14, all p<0.05). This interaction (also
see additional interpretation of the triple interaction in the
electronic supplementary material) showed that valence influ-
enced ΔEV, only when the outcome was experienced alone
(interaction valence*ΔEV all z>2.835, all p<0.004), not in
group (all z<1.350, all p>0.177). Negative versus positive out-
comes reduced the ΔEV parameter for the next lottery choice,
only when experienced alone (figure 3d), but critically not in
group (see next paragraph on how this is different based on
group status). There was no significant change in ΔAR par-
ameter based on valence and previous condition (all p>0.1).
These results show that negative outcomes experienced alone
disrupted the subsequent lottery choice by reducing reliance
on expected value to guide choices. However, this was not
the casewhen negative outcomeswere experienced as a group.
(i) Responsibility modulates the adverse impact of negative
outcome
Is the influence of negative outcomes on future lottery choices
modulated by responsibility? As we argued earlier, our
experimental paradigmpermits investigating the role of respon-
sibility by contrasting behaviour when participants were in the
groupmajority versusminority.We focusedon trialswherepar-
ticipants chose to vote in group and entered as predictors of the
lottery choice the following variables: group status (t− 1) and
valence(t− 1) and their interaction with expected value ΔEV(t)
and anticipated regret ΔAR(t). An interaction between group
status, valence and ΔEV was observed (meta-analytically z=
−2.79, p=0.005, experiment 1 p=0.05, experiment 2 p=0.02),
showing that only when people were in group majority was
their subsequent choice unaffected by negative outcome (inter-
actionΔEV*valence all p>0.11).However, after experiencing the
negative outcome as minority (interaction ΔEV*valence after
minority meta-analytically z=−1.89, p=0.05, experiment 1 p=
0.02, experiment 2 p=0.10), ΔEV parameter was increased, not
reduced, after negative versus positive outcomes (figure 3d).4. Discussion
Our novel experimental design in which participants were
given the choice to play alone or in a group on a trial-by-trial
basis provides, for the first time to our knowledge, a cognitive
basis for themotivation to join groups.We show that the higher
their negative experience, the more likely participants were to
join a group, consistent with decreasing the burden of individ-
ual responsibility and blame [1]. Accordingly, joining the group
reduced the impact of anticipated regret on choices. Moreover,
contrary to individually experienced negative outcomes,
experiencing negative outcomes as a member of group
majority did not impair subsequent lottery choice as compared
to positive outcomes. These results suggest that voting in a
group rendered people less vulnerable and responsive to
anticipated and experienced outcomes.
We note that our design was not meant to and did not
permit accounting for the collective behaviour of interacting
individuals. Our objective here was to take the individual’s
perspective to address what motivates people to join a
group. Therefore, we chose a majority vote procedure using
previously gathered responses from participants in a separateexperiment thereby maintaining control over other ‘group
members’ behaviour and allowing us to address majority
and minority impact on the choice to play alone or join a
group. Future research is necessary to examine whether our
results replicate under the less controlled design of an entire
group of autonomous interacting individuals.
It has been suggested that responsibility rests on perceiving
oneself as the agent of an action and believing that one could
have done otherwise [14]. Both conditions were met here
when individuals played alone: they were the only agent and
had access to counterfactual outcomes and therefore were
highly responsible for the outcome. Joining a group to diminish
responsibility over decision outcomes could help alleviate
negative emotions such as loss and regret [1]. Accordingly, par-
ticipants were more likely to join groups after negative versus
positive outcomes and were sensitive to the amount of experi-
enced outcomes. These results are consistent with previous
studies on delegation showing that people prefer to give up
autonomy when faced with difficult choices, choices they
might regret, or decisions with high risk of error [5,10,15–18].
In parallel to the influence of valence, participants tended
to repeat their choice to stay alone, revealing an inertia/
status-quo effect [19]. This was also the case when people
were playing in group. Moreover, the tendency to repeat
one’s choice was observed in participants who regularly
switched their choice from playing alone to playing in group.
These results suggest that (i) there are baseline, trait-like prefer-
ences to play alone or in group that are independent from
experienced outcomes and (ii) even when people vary their
choice, a tendency to repeat the previous choice may show
that participants exploit the same option before switching.
Interestingly, the emotion of regret may induce a status-quo
bias [9]––suggesting that status quo in the decision to play
alone or in group may be a strategy to reduce regret in the
context of the current study.
Our main prediction in this paper was that being in a
group will help protect against the negative consequences of
decisions [1]. Confirming this prediction, we show that joining
a group after negative outcomes has a protective role: partici-
pants were less influenced by future regret and outcomes
when picking a lottery in a group as compared to when
acting alone. From the shared responsibility hypothesis per-
spective [1], this might suggest that participants feel less
responsible for their choicewhen playing in a group. Relatedly,
previous studies have shown that subjective ratings of respon-
sibility and regret for probabilistic outcomes are reducedwhen
people play lotteries collectively rather than individually
[9,20]. Regret has been considered as a form of automatic
self-punishment [21], based on a comparison of one’s own
actions and what is accepted by the group. Following this con-
ception of regret, collective decisions would be favoured as
they would naturally reduce self-punishment. Additionally,
given that expected value influence also decreased in groups,
participants may have chosen to play in the group to exert
less effort––a phenomenon known as social loafing [22].
When already part of a group, agreement with the group
majority predicted the decision to stay in group on the next
round. Even in our experiment’s minimal group set-up where
the other groupmemberswere totally unknown to participants,
they showed a bias towards staying within a group that sup-
ported their decisions. Possibly, simply agreeing with the
group creates an in-group favouritism such as in minimal




8again. Indeed, neuroscientific evidence [24,25] for motivational
value of like-minded others’ agreement and social support for
our preferences points to the importance of group endorsement
as a strong motivational driver of choice behaviour.
A difference in the influence of experiencing outcomes was
observed that depended on the participant’s majority versus
minority status: while experiencing negative (versus positive)
outcomes in the minority led to an increased optimization of
choice in the next lottery choice (increased influence of
expected value), no such difference was observed after experi-
encing outcomes in majority. Being in the group majority also
reduced the sensitivity to the valence of experienced outcomes
for the next group choice (significant only in experiment 1, p=
0.09meta-analytically). Being in a group could promote a sense
of joint agency. Joint agency has been described as ‘we-mode’
and consists of a shift from self-agency to we-agency in collec-
tive actions [26–28]. Individual decision-makers might be
operating in different modes when they are in the majority
and thus perceiving their group as an entity ‘we-mode’ [27]
versus when they are in the minority and see their group as a
collection of isolated individuals. Our findings could be inter-
preted as evidence that when people are in this ‘we-mode,’
calculations of loss and regret may become less relevant.
Altogether, our findings suggest that people may be less
sensitive to both anticipated and experienced outcomes when
they vote as a group. Interference arising from the social
rewards of finding oneself in a group may prevent people
from learning from feedback or even reduce their motivation
to seek feedback. In line with this view, people do less fact-
checking when they encounter suspicious information in
social digital environments while in the presence of others
than if they are alone [29]. Furthermore, people are less likely
to integrate new information that contradicts the beliefs of
their group [30]. Together with our results, these findings
suggest that being in a group might interfere with the inte-
gration of new information—for example, from feedback.
This idea has far-reaching implications for understanding the
impact of social context on political attitudes. Commonsense requires that individuals reflect on previous actions.
Our findings suggest that this may be less likely to occur
when negative outcomes have resulted from a vote within a
group. This helps explain why partisan allegiances are resilient
[30] to outright the evidence of incompetence in political lea-
dership, incriminating and scandalous information about
politicians, and even catastrophic outcomes of failed policies
that were supported by the majority.
In conclusion, experience related to factual and counter-
factual outcomes influenced people’s propensity to make
decisions alone or in a group: experiencing high negative out-
comes pushed participants towards joining decisions in a
group that benefited from reduced anticipated regret. Nega-
tive versus positive outcomes experienced alone disrupted
future choices, while those experienced as a group majority
protected from such influence. These findings offer important
insight into questions such as whether belonging to a political
party renders its members less careful and responsive to the
party’s anticipated or experienced failures and successes.
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